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Abstract
Legal structures may form barriers to, or enablers of, adoption of precision agriculture management with small autonomous 
agricultural robots. This article develops a conceptual regulatory framework for small autonomous agricultural robots, from 
a practical, self-contained engineering guide perspective, sufficient to get working research and commercial agricultural 
roboticists quickly and easily up and running within the law. The article examines the liability framework, or rather lack of 
it, for agricultural robotics in EU, and their transpositions to UK law, as a case study illustrating general international legal 
concepts and issues. It examines how the law may provide mitigating effects on the liability regime, and how contracts can 
be developed between agents within it to enable smooth operation. It covers other legal aspects of operation such as the use 
of shared communications resources and privacy in the reuse of robot-collected data. Where there are some grey areas in 
current law, it argues that new proposals could be developed to reform these to promote further innovation and investment 
in agricultural robots.
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1 Introduction
Self-driving vehicles are rapidly arriving both on (Guizzo 
2011) and off (Blackmore et al. 2004) roads. In the agri-
cultural setting, technology has progressed from tractor 
driver-assistive systems such as RTK-GPS displays, to fully 
autonomous, self-driving platforms capable of carrying out 
agricultural tasks with no human intervention (Pedersen et al. 
2006). While legal aspects of on-road autonomous vehicles 
have been well studied (Beiker 2012; Anderson et al. 2014, 
Pinto et al. 2012; Douma and Palodichuk 2012; Brodsky 
2016), there is a need for an analogous understanding of off-
road agricultural vehicles’ legal positions, despite the forecast 
for the agri-robotics section to reach 5.7bn USD by the year 
2024 (Transparency Market Research 2017). The present 
study reviews the relevant legal frameworks from a practical 
engineering implementer of agricultural robotics technolo-
gies to fill this need. It is intended as a self-contained guide 
for practising engineers to find all the information needed to 
get their autonomous agricultural robotic research systems 
up and running, quickly and easily within the law. As such it 
does not represent the formal legal advice, which should be 
taken in addition to the overview given here.
Autonomous agricultural vehicles have been developed 
in two broad classes: automated large tractors and smaller 
(e.g., < 1 tonne) precision robots. Automated tractor systems 
have been developed (Ishida et al. 1998; Michio et al. 2002; 
Blackmore et al. 2004; Dvorak 2016) based on existing man-
ual-drive tractors, which already have commercially avail-
able high precision GPS guidance. These systems compute 
paths to swathe fields, typically in rows with headland turns. 
In some cases, this guidance consists of telling the human 
operator precisely what angle to turn the steering wheel at 
each second (e.g., Trimble EZ-Guide Lightbar, http://www.
trimb le.com); others show deviation from the computed 
path and leave the human driver to correct for it. Automated 
tractors typically aim to perform the same type of work as 
manual-drive tractors, namely bulk operations across whole 
fields, such as seeding, spraying and harvesting of row crops.
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In contrast, small autonomous robots for agriculture 
(“agribots”, Fig. 1) have focused on precision applica-
tions. Large vehicles are required for bulk operations due 
to the need for physically transporting bulk materials such 
as seeds, fertiliser and produce. Small robots make up for 
reduced bulk transport capability by aiming, ultimately, 
to work on a per-plant basis. This enables them to trans-
port smaller amounts of more targetted materials, includ-
ing reduced herbicide doses to apply to individual weeds 
(Binch and Fox 2017), detect the fertiliser needs of and 
apply fertilisers to (Singh and Shaligram 2014) individual 
plants; and harvesting of plants (Bac et al. 2014) when 
they are individually optimally ready for consumption.
In some cases, precision systems are also found on 
large tractors, with variable rate controls uses to make 
bulk operations more precise (Escola et al. 2013).
The legal implications of these technologies are differ-
ent from those of on-road self-driving vehicles. On-road 
vehicle operations take place in public places—high-
ways—which are governed by highways legislation. In 
contrast, most agricultural robots are intended to operate 
on privately owned agricultural land, governed by differ-
ent business, agricultural and environmental laws. How-
ever, such land is not free from interactions with humans, 
whose safety and legal positions must be considered. Farm 
owners, managers and workers may be present as well as 
walkers on public footpaths and trespassers. In the event 
of accidents, the roles of owners, managers, manufactur-
ers and designers of systems must be considered. Existing 
legal, environmental restrictions and responsibilities must 
be taken into account—damage caused to the environment 
is a greater concern than in the on-road case, including the 
application of chemicals and damage to crops and soils.
1.1  Overview
In these respects, this article addresses three questions: 
What is the legal regime on the liability of manufacturers, 
suppliers and users of autonomous robots in the UK/EU? 
Does the law provide any mitigation of liability which 
could promote innovation in autonomous robots? Apart 
from the law in the UK/EU, what are the current debates 
and legal outlook on robotics and how can these shape the 
law in the area of small autonomous agricultural vehicles?
After brief introductions to engineering for lawyers and 
law for engineers, the Sect. 2 of the article examines the 
liability framework which applies to autonomous robots 
given lack of a separate or specific framework for robot-
ics in the UK and the EU. Section 3 considers how the 
law may provide mitigating effects on the liability regime. 
These parts are intended for use by practising roboticists in 
need of a self-contained guide to their legal environment.
Section 4 presents the debates on grey areas in the law 
and proposals which may be adopted to reform the law and 
promote future innovation and investment in small autono-
mous agricultural vehicles. This part is intended both for 
use by policymakers and as a demarcation of potentially 
dangerous uncertain legal areas for practising roboticists.
The article concludes that the law could facilitate inno-
vation in the agribots for the following reasons: The legal 
framework for autonomous robots cuts across different laws. 
Therefore, liability could be shared or distributed among 
different parties to a contract for the use or operation of an 
agribot. All legislation which imposes liabilities also pro-
vides corresponding defences which may aid the avoidance 
of liability or the mitigation of damages. There are in par-
ticular specific defences which address the peculiarities of 
technologies. Contracts can be used to define the rights and 
obligations of respective parties, and unless the law other-
wise specifies, the contract can exclude liabilities for specific 
claims. Courts are legally obliged to consider the utility and 
social and economic value of an activity in awarding dam-
ages for loss and injury. Current debates suggest an apprecia-
tion of the new challenges posed by innovations in robotics 
for law and policy. These can facilitate resolution and legal 
intervention in the grey areas surrounding the legal frame-
work for small autonomous agricultural vehicles.
1.2  Basic self‑driving technology concepts (for 
lawyers)
All vehicle automation systems are in practice probabil-
istic in their behaviour to some extent. Modern machine 
navigation (Thrun 2005) and object recognition systems 
use Bayesian probability frameworks (Bishop 2006). 
Fig. 1  Example of an autonomous small robot for agriculture (agri-
bot). This agribot weights 250 kg and precision spray weeds on hill 
farms. (Photo: Ibex Automation Ltd.)
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Probabilities appear in these models in two distinct ways. 
First, the models assume precise models of the probabil-
istic distribution of sensory features given states of the 
world. By itself, this assumes that the world is random and 
probabilistic, though the probabilities in the equations can, 
in theory, be manipulated precisely and deterministically. 
Outdoor environments, weather, and the complexity of 
plant biology and animal behaviours ensure that the world 
is indeed random for all practical purposes—this contrasts 
with other robotics applications such as food processing 
production lines where the environment and produce can 
be tightly controlled and standardised (Chua et al. 2003). 
However, second, the Bayesian inference is known to be 
computationally intractable in general (Cooper 1990). This 
means that system designers can work only with approxi-
mation algorithms. Some of these approximations are 
deterministic such as Variational Bayes (Fox and Roberts 
2012), while popular Monte Carlo approximations use 
random number generation as a seed for stochastic sam-
pling (Andrieu et al. 2003). Stochastic methods do not 
have deterministic behaviour, though they converge to 
exact answers in the theoretical case of infinite computa-
tion time.
The bayesian theory may further make use of prior infor-
mation in addition to real-time sensing (Bernardo and Smith 
2001). This means that the perception of a state, and action 
selection based on it, can be determined not just by current 
inputs but also by assumptions and/or observations from 
the past about similar states. In the on-road case, historical 
data might show that other road users of particular demo-
graphics have statically predictive tendencies to behave in 
certain ways during interactions with the autonomous vehi-
cle. Statistically, making use of such information as well 
as real-time sensors is optimal for decision-making. How-
ever, the ethics of doing so are controversial. Use of prior 
information is expressly prohibited in most legal systems, 
even though it is known to give more accurate judgements 
(Levitt and Laskey 2000). For off-road agricultural vehicles, 
such human interactions are of less concern, but similar 
questions about the use of priors may arise. A vehicle may 
behave in ways unexpected by its owner or operator if its 
designers have programmed it with different prior expecta-
tions that those of the owner or operator. For example, a 
weed spraying robot designer might assume that weeds are a 
priori more probable to be found near walls than in the open 
field, but a farmer’s particular field might have all the weeds 
in the centre, leading to the farmer complaining about poor 
quality spraying decisions. Rather than made such assump-
tions manually, the designer may have the system learn from 
data. The designer can collect historical data and analysed 
before use of the vehicle, to inform and fix the priors. As 
with manual assumptions, the choice of this data is essen-
tial and will still reflect the designers’ assumptions about 
what constitutes “typical” data. Again, if this differs from 
the users’ assumptions, then problems may occur. In some 
systems, the learning from data process may continue after 
the sale and use of the vehicles, with algorithms updating 
their priors to include observations from the user’s runs, 
including data from the present day’s work right up to the 
present decision time. In this case, the prior information 
may now include a mixture of the designers directly pro-
grammed assumption, the designer’s historical data, and the 
user’s data, which has previously been identified as a legal 
problem (Beck 2016).
As well as use for training priors, data collected from 
users’ farms during operation is valuable for analysis. For 
example, yield maps (Blackmore et al. 2003) can contain 
information not only financially valuable to the farmer but 
also to neighbouring and distant farms when used to pre-
dict trends and correlations. As with other “big data” sys-
tems such as in-car GPS route planning, which collects data 
on drivers’ locations, questions arise about who owns this 
data—the owner, operator or designer?
1.3  Basic legal concepts (for engineers)
The purpose of the law is to enable all stakeholders to get 
along with one another in a society. This includes regulat-
ing how they should share scarce public resources, and how 
they should handle externalities caused to one another as 
side effects of their private contracts. For example, com-
municating with outdoor robots requires sharing of the radio 
spectrum with other local users, whilst applying fertiliser 
which runs off into a river may have negative externalities 
to both the general public, who use it in their water supply, 
and to individual neighbouring farmers.
There is no specific regulatory regime for agricultural 
robots or for robots generally, and indeed it may be difficult 
to have a single regulatory regime as robots differ on a num-
ber of criteria including functions, level of autonomy and 
human–machine interaction.1 Therefore, liability could cut 
across different areas of the law including tort, contract and 
criminal laws, (as well as administrative actions) as shown 
in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2  Basic divisions of law
1 For example, there are service robots, military robots, toy robots 
and so on.
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1.3.1  Torts
A tort is a civil wrong (committed by a person called the 
tortfeasor) that results in loss or damage to another person, 
and anyone who has suffered a loss as a result of another’s 
civil wrong can bring an action for redress. For example, the 
manufacturer or producer of a defective product can be held 
liable for the tort of negligence if the product causes per-
sonal injury or other damage to the user. Therefore, because 
the agribot is likely to be regarded as a product, its manufac-
turers/designers would be subject to laws regulating liabil-
ity for defective products. Also, agricultural contractors and 
farmers as users or owners of the agribot, and their respec-
tive agents can be subject to different legal rules and statu-
tory provisions governing negligence, accidents and injury 
to individuals as well as for loss of or damage to property.
1.3.2  Contracts
While a tort is a civil wrong entitling a party to sue the other 
party for a breach of duty owed under the law, a contract is 
an agreement which the law would enforce. The parties vol-
untarily agree the terms of a contract and where permitted 
by law, the parties may exclude or limit their liabilities for 
certain acts or omissions.2 Stated differently, a contractual 
relationship is governed by the contract rather than by law 
and parties may bring a (civil) action to enforce the terms 
of the contract including claims for damages for breach of 
the contract. In civil actions such as tort and contract, the 
required standard of proof is the ‘balance of probabilities’, 
and the claimant must discharge the burden of proofing any 
loss, injury or damage. Contracts may, in some cases, be 
used to transfer a liability between parties.
1.3.3  Crimes
Unlike civil proceedings that are initiated by private citizens 
against other citizens or organizations or the government, it 
is the state that initiates criminal proceedings for a breach of 
the criminal law. A crime is a wrong against the society, and 
any act that constitutes a crime must be so defined by the law 
and punishment there for stipulated by the law. The standard 
of proof in criminal cases is ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’, 
and the onus of discharging the burden lays on the prosecution 
or the state.3 Punishment for crimes can range from minor 
fines to lengthy imprisonment. It is important to note that 
although there is a development towards ‘corporate criminal 
liability’ (the concept that corporations should be held liable 
for criminal acts of officials such as directors, managers and 
employees), there is no common European approach in this 
area and domestic laws vary. Some countries (such as Ger-
many) do not impose criminal liability on corporations, others 
rely on administrative sanctions (See notes below).
1.3.4  Administrative actions
Administrative actions are concerned with activities of 
administrative agencies to which Authority is delegated based 
on the agency’s expertise on the subject matter. Administra-
tive actions, therefore, involve oversight functions through 
the enforcement of statutory laws (laws made by parliament) 
and rules made by the administrative agencies themselves. 
Unlike torts where individuals can bring actions for dam-
age or injury and criminal prosecutions initiated by the state, 
administrative actions involve ensuring compliance through 
oversight which may entail levying fines and other sanctions 
on organizations in breach of the law. To invoke sanctions, 
damage or injury need not occur, all that is required is non-
compliance with standards set by the law. For example, data 
protection authorities can impose fines for non-compliance 
with the principles of data protection even when data has not 
been lost or stolen as a result of such non-compliance. Also, 
environment protection agencies can impose fines for failure 
to report pollution or to take remedial actions.
It is important to note that although liability is discussed 
under the separate heads below, in practice, civil and crimi-
nal liability may arise from the same activity and administra-
tive actions may overlap with civil and criminal sanctions 
(See notes on data protection below).
1.3.5  Laws, regulations, directives and standards
The potential for torts and crimes is introduced by legal acts 
of national and international parliaments. In the EU, Regula-
tions and Directives are different types of legal acts of the 
EU. According to Article 288 of the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union,
A regulation shall have general application. It shall 
be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all 
Member States.
A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be 
achieved, upon each Member State to which it is 
addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities 
the choice of form and methods.
2 Exclusion and limiting clauses allow parties to either limit or 
exclude liabilities for acts or omissions for which they would ordinar-
ily be liable.
3 Health and safety law is the exception to this rule; the onus is on 
the defendant(s) to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the courts that 
they have discharged their duties under health and safety law.
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Thus, an EU regulation is an immediately binding law 
without further actions required, while directives are typi-
cally ‘transposed’ by member states into new local laws 
which implement them. In the UK, directives with relevance 
to Health and Safety are implemented in the form of regula-
tions under the powers granted by the Health and Safety at 
Work Act 1974.
Technical standards are distinct from laws, and their use 
is usually voluntary. Standards are defined by technical com-
mittees, including the International Standards Organization 
(ISO), the European Committee for Standardization (EN), 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI), national com-
mittees such as the British Standards (BS) in the UK, local 
industry sector organizations, and sometimes within a single 
organization. Reasons for voluntary use include the ability to 
provide the customer with a guarantee—via contract law—of 
meeting a publicly known and accepted level of quality or 
safety; and also, the desire to make use of industry-wide tech-
nical best practices consolidated in a standard. Like direc-
tives, standards are often transposed between regions and 
subregions, for example a standard named with “ISO EN 
BS” may have begun as an international ISO standard, then 
transposed downward via both Europe and UK organizations; 
or it may have begun as a UK standard and been transposed 
upwards through the EU and ISO.
In some cases, the law may grant special status to a stand-
ard, giving it legal force, such as requiring all manufacturers 
to implement it for certain types of product. This is known 
as “calling up” the standard.
In the EU, compliance with Product Safety standards 
which are published in the Official Journal of the European 
Union is assumed to demonstrate compliance with relevant 
directives supported by the standards. Some directives will 
recommend the creation of such standards to be created 
along with their legislation, to aid compliance with that leg-
islation. These are known as ‘harmonised standards’.
Several EU directives require products to obtain a special 
“CE mark” standard (Conformite Europeanne) before sale. 
The CE mark then allows sale across the European Economic 
Area (EEA), showing compliance with all relevant directives.
The relationships between laws, directives, and standards 
are illustrated in Fig. 3.
2  Regulating agribots: legal framework
In the light of the above, the sections that follow examine 
how tortious, contractual and criminal liabilities, and use of 
standards could arise in the manufacture, use or operation 
of agricultural robots.
2.1  Liability in tort
2.1.1  Product defect
EU Directive regulates liability for defective products on 
the approximation of Laws, Regulations and Administra-
tive Provisions of the Member States for Defective Prod-
ucts.4 [transposed in the UK as the Consumer Protection Act 
(CPA) 1987]. The directive applies to all types of products 
including agricultural products. Under the law, “product” 
is defined as all movables even if incorporated into another 
movable or an immovable (See art 2 of amendment to direc-
tive). A producer means the manufacturer of a finished prod-
uct, the producer of any raw material or the manufacturer 
of a component part. A producer also includes any person 
who, by putting his trademark or other distinguishing feature 
on the product presents himself as its producer (art three 
directive).
The Directive lays down the principle of liability without 
fault or strict liability which means a person injured by a 
defective product can claim damages even if the defect was 
not due to the producer/manufacturers negligence. A defec-
tive product is one which does not provide the safety which 
a person is entitled to expect, considering, all circumstances 
including, the presentation of the product, such as adequacy 
of the warning,5 the use to which it could reasonably be 
expected that the product would be put and the time when 
the product was put into circulation are factors (art 6). The 
standard of the defect is, therefore, an objective one. For 
example, a product is defective if its safety is not such as 
persons generally (everyone and not the particular claimant 
Fig. 3  Relationships between laws, directives, and standards. Crea-
tion is shown by solid arrows. Compliance is shown by dashed arrows
4 See Directive 85/374/EEC on the approximation of the laws, regu-
lations and administrative provisions of the Member States concern-
ing liability for defective products (as amended by Directive 1999/34/
ec) The Directive is implemented in the UK by the Consumer Protec-
tion Act (CPA) 1987).
5 See e.g. UK CPA s 3 (2)(a).
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injured by the product) are entitled to expect. Also, the law 
does not infer defect from the fact that a better or safer prod-
uct was subsequently put into circulation or permit persons 
to expect standards of safety that are unknown or which do 
not exist at the relevant time (art 6, 7 Directive, s 3 CPA).
Moreover, to succeed in an action for damages, the claim-
ant or injured person must prove the damage and the defect 
in the product as well as the causal relationship between the 
damage and the defect (art 4). In other words, the claimant 
must prove that he suffered damage, that there was a defect 
in the product and that the defect caused the damage. Pre-
sumably, therefore, if a claimant is unable to prove defect, he 
cannot prove that loss or damage resulted from such defect. 
However, in cases where the causal link is established, the 
law also provides for defences which are of particular rel-
evance to the manufacturer of the agribot. As examples, it is 
a defence that the producer (or manufacturer) did not put the 
product into circulation or that the defect did not exist at the 
time the product was put into circulation (art 7). These argu-
ably cover instances where someone caused the fault after 
the manufacturer supplied the agribot or where interference 
with software causes the agribot to malfunction or where 
the agribot has been used for a purpose for which it was not 
intended (See notes on dual-use below).
Other grounds for avoiding liability include a claim that the 
safety fault was an inevitable result of obeying the law (e.g., 
the agribot could be safer but for provisions of the law which 
excludes the use of certain technology). Also, it is a defence 
that the manufacturer could not have made the product more 
secure or safer given the state of knowledge in science and 
technology (‘development risk defence’) (art 7(e)). Therefore, 
it is a defence under the law that the state of scientific or tech-
nical knowledge at the relevant time is such that the manufac-
turer could not have known the defect in the product. This sug-
gests that the law does not expect manufacturers or designers 
to wait until a safer technology is available before introducing 
their products. All that is required is that the standard of safety 
corresponds to state of the art in scientific or technological 
knowledge at the relevant time. However, the Directive makes 
this defence optional, and it would, therefore, only avail the 
manufacturer where it is provided for under national law.6
It is important to stress that requirement for proof, and 
indeed the definition of a defect under the law is not intended 
to undermine consumer protection. Rather, it is intended to 
strike a reasonable balance between the obligation to protect 
consumers and the need to promote innovation in a fast-
evolving technology environment. For example, while owing 
to the complexity, technicality and probabilistic behaviour 
of products like an agribot, it may be difficult and expensive 
for claimants to prove a defect, it must also be assumed that 
developments in artificial intelligence, robotics and machine 
learning would mean that safety standards become outdated 
fairly quickly. Therefore, unless the law limits the liabil-
ity of manufacturers to safety standards based on the state 
of scientific and technical knowledge, their liability could 
be indeterminable or infinite, and this may adversely affect 
innovation and development.
It is also relevant to note that damage includes damage 
caused by death or personal injury and damage or destruc-
tion caused to property other than the defective product itself 
(art 9). Liability imposed by the law cannot be excluded or 
limited by contract and can be joint and several.7 However, 
member states may provide for the limitation of liability for 
damage resulting from death or personal injury provided that 
the amount shall not be less than 70 million ECU (art 5,12).
2.1.2  Accidents and health and safety law
In the UK, health and safety law is implemented through 
the provision of the Health And Safety At Work etc Act 
(HASAWA) 1974. The Act enables the enforcement body, 
the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) to bring criminal 
prosecutions under Section 33 of the Act against organiza-
tions deemed to have breached the statutory duties it imposes.
The primary duties imposed by the act are described in 
Sect. 2 and Sect. 3 of the Act. The former imposes duties on 
employers to ensure the safety and health at work of employ-
ees; the latter on employers (and self-employed persons) to 
ensure the safety at work of those persons other than their 
employees who could be harmed by the employers’ under-
taking. An undertaking is defined by the set of activities 
carried out by an organization; this extends to the design and 
manufacture of products such as agribots and includes their 
use. Therefore, an accident whereby a member of the public 
is injured by an agribot could result in a criminal prosecution 
against the owner/user of the agribot, and/or the designer/
manufacturer. The balance of this prosecution depending 
mainly on the nature of the accident.
Section 6 of HASAWA1974 imposes duties on the manu-
facturers etc. (including designers) for the safety of articles 
used at work. Therefore, prosecutions could hypothetically 
also be initiated for a breach of this Section; however, in 
reality, this is seldom the case.8 Further, the duties of design-
ers and manufacturers of agribots are better described under 
6 See arts 7 and 15(1)(b) Directive, See also Sect. 4(1)(e) of the UK 
CPA which infact allows this defence.
7 Joint and several liability means the person injured by a defective 
product can sue multiple parties and recover full damages from one 
and/or all of them.
8 HSE public register of convictions indicates that this is around 
thirty (30) successful prosecutions under Sect. 6 in 10 years.
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the Consumer Protection Act 1987, and / or the Supply of 
Machinery (Safety) Regulations 2008.
Prosecutions for breach of duties under Sections 2–6 of 
HASAWA1974, if elevated to the Crown Court, invoke a 
potential maximum penalty of two (2) years imprisonment, 
and / or an unlimited fine. In all cases described above, the 
duty is qualified and limited by the term ‘so far as is reason-
ably practicable’ (SFAIRP). This is also commonly phrased 
as the duty to reduce risk to a level that is ‘As Low as Rea-
sonably Practicable’ (ALARP). These terms are largely 
interchangeable, the former used in legislation, the latter 
commonly used in engineering communities.
The key element is the concept of reasonable practicabil-
ity. This was defined in common law decades before9 the 
implementation of HASAWA1974 and provides a funda-
mental means to both limits the duty imposed by the Act 
and mitigate the liability incurred following an accident 
and resultant prosecution. If the defendant(s) can demon-
strate that all reasonably practicable measures were taken 
to reduce the risk, they thereby demonstrate that they fully 
discharged their duties under HASAWA1974.
Demonstration that all reasonably practicable measures 
have been taken (often termed ‘demonstration of ALARP’) 
requires the following measures be taken10:
1) Identification of reasonably foreseeable hazards and 
assessment of risk;
2) Adoption of authoritative good practice for control of 
risk;
3) Identification of further practicable risk reduction meas-
ures;
4) Implementation of identified risk reduction measures 
unless it can be demonstrated that the sacrifice (cost, 
time, effort) associated with doing so is grossly dispro-
portionate to the safety benefit gained from the measure.
The above steps (2)–(4) are further predicated on the 
assumption that the overall risk to the safety and health 
of persons affected by the activity/product/system under 
assessment is in general, tolerable. If the risk is assessed as 
intolerable, then the owner of the duty to reduce that risk 
must do so regardless of any consideration of sacrifice. HSE 
guidance R2P2 provides a quantitative baseline definition of 
intolerable and tolerable risk.11
Where risks are well understood and defined by an industry 
body of knowledge, completion of steps (1) and (2) above will 
be sufficient to demonstrate ALARP. This can include com-
pliance with legislation, approved codes of practice (ACOP) 
and in some cases engineering standards, where these can be 
shown to be directly and fully applicable and correctly applied.
Where such compliance is not possible, for example, 
because the technology associated with activity/product/
system is new or novel, or because it is not possible to fully 
comply with relevant standards, further effort will need to 
be expended on risk assessment and/or engineering study, 
to determine what can be practically done to reduce the risk.
Demonstration of gross disproportion relies upon the 
assessment of the benefit of the risk reduction measure and 
consideration of the sacrifice (e.g., financial cost) of imple-
mentation of the measure. The concept of gross disproportion 
ensures that this is not a straightforward cost–benefit analysis, 
whereby the owner could demur if the sacrifice simply exceeds 
the benefit; rather the sacrifice must grossly exceed the benefit 
before the duty to implement the measure is discharged.
The above assessment can often be carried out quali-
tatively, for example, through use of a continuous matrix 
(such as the Boston Square), placing the effectiveness of a 
risk reduction measure on one axis, and difficulty involved 
in implementing the measure on the other axis. Potential 
improvement measures are then ranked relatively against 
each other. There are also a number of simplified screen-
ing tools in general use that highlight qualitatively those 
measures that should be implemented, should not be imple-
mented, and those which require further study. In all cases, 
these qualitative methods will need to take account of the 
requirement to demonstrate gross disproportionality between 
the sacrifice and the safety benefit.
Where sufficient information is available, and where 
the resolution of the cost/benefit decision is less clear (for 
example, an initial screening tool results in the require-
ment for further study), a full quantitative assessment can 
be undertaken. This requires the quantification of the full 
lifecycle risk without further mitigation (sometimes termed 
the vanilla risk), for example, in terms of Potential Loss of 
Life (PLL) or Fatalities and Weighted Injuries Rate (FWI); 
similar quantification of the risk reduction measure(s); and 
combination of these values with a Value for Preventing a 
Fatality (VPF).12 The sacrifice associated with implementing 
these measures is then calculated, and the measure imple-
mented unless the sacrifice is found to be grossly dispropor-
tionate to the safety benefit.
9 Judgement of Lord Asquith in Edwards vs National Coal Board 
1949.
10 Health and Safety Executive. Reducing Risks Protecting People 
(R2P2).
11 1 × 10− 3 fatalities per annum for workers, 1 × 10− 4 fatalities per 
annum for members of the public.
12 R2P2 provides a value of £1,000,000 in 2001, however, this value, 
when subject to a reasonable allowance for inflation, should be con-
sidered a minimum value. Various higher values have been applied in 
different industries.
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Definitions of gross disproportion vary dependent on 
context; however, a useful rule of thumb is to consider the 
initial level of risk. Where that initial risk is tolerable but 
high, i.e., close to the border with the intolerable region, the 
gross disproportion factor should be similarly high. Where 
the risk is tolerable but low, the gross disproportion fac-
tor may also be lower. In some industries, in some circum-
stances, a sacrifice that is 3 × the benefit may be considered 
grossly disproportionate; whereas in other cases, a factor of 
10 × may be required before a measure should be considered 
not reasonably practicable to implement.
The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regula-
tions 1999 impose a duty on employers to undertake a suitable 
and sufficient risk assessment in support of the duties placed 
upon them by Sections 2 and 3 of HASAWA1974. However, 
even were this not the case, a demonstration that risk has been 
reduced ALARP is challenging to achieve without carrying 
out such an assessment. In fact, the requirement for risk assess-
ment has arguably been part of UK common law since 1949.13
The requirement for risk assessment, should not be con-
fused with a requirement for risk analysis. For a risk assess-
ment to be suitable and sufficient, it must demonstrate that 
appropriate action has been taken to reduce the risk. Where 
sufficient information is available, a detailed analysis in sup-
port of this action may be beneficial. However, this is often 
not required, and sometimes not justifiable. For example, 
where there are high levels of uncertainty associated with a 
particular hazard, which render conventional risk assessment 
techniques unreliable, a precautionary principle14 should 
be adopted. This principle requires that the assessment and 
action were taken to be based more on the putative conse-
quences of a risk, rather than the likelihood.
In the case of agribot use/design/manufacture, where 
authoritative good practice is still primarily to be defined, 
compliance with health and safety law will depend on the 
suitability and sufficiency of the risk assessments carried out 
by duty holders. Further, whereas the balance of prosecu-
tions in the UK as a whole tends to focus more on immediate 
causation15 (i.e., who are the persons/organizations who ‘last 
touched the risk’), the nature of the autonomous robots may 
largely necessitate a greater focus on the prosecutions of 
designers and manufacturers. They may be more frequently 
called upon to present formal safety justifications of their 
autonomous products that demonstrate anterior identifica-
tion, consideration and management of relevant hazards and 
risks. Complete justification will necessarily include the 
documentation of critical design decisions, the identified 
practicable risk reduction measures, and reasonable justifi-
cations for the measures rejected, as well as those, adopted.
For users/owners to discharge their safety and health 
duties, they may be largely dependent on the decisions are 
taken autonomously by the agribots. In corollary, the extent 
to which they can be held liable for those autonomous deci-
sions is limited by the extent to which they can train/teach 
the agribot before full operations; this is in turn limited by 
the safeguards and risk reduction measures defined by the 
designer as a result of their risk assessment. As with all 
risk reduction measures, a hierarchy of control16 should be 
adopted by designers.
Elimination of hazards during the early phases of design 
should be prioritized; where hazards cannot be eliminated 
they should be controlled primarily be engineering means, 
for example, safety functions17 that bring the agribot into 
a safe state upon detection of a failure or the presence of 
a member of the public in close proximity. Lower levels 
of this hierarchy will necessarily include the provision of 
instructions for use, informed by the suitable and sufficient 
designer risk assessment. In effect, the users will be respon-
sible for management of the residual risk associated with 
the agribot, i.e., those risks which could not be designed 
and engineered away.
Notwithstanding the above, there is guidance avail-
able that will be partly applicable to the use of agribots 
and may assist users of agribots with the implementation 
of safe systems of work. This will necessarily include 
appropriate traffic management arrangements18, includ-
ing measures to ensure exclusion of the public, route plan-
ning, lighting and visibility, where necessary, as guided by 
15 Review of prosecutions for 2016/17 under the CDM Regulations 
2015 describes a total of seven (7) potential breaches of duties for 
Principal Designer / Designer duties, whereas a total of ninety-nine 
(99) potential breaches of client duties, four-hundred and eighty-nine 
(489) potential breaches of Principal Contactor duties, and two-hun-
dred and seventy-eight (278) potential breaches of Contractor duties 
were identified.
16 Several different hierarchies are available, for example, the com-
monly used ERIC PD (Elimination, Reduction, Isolation, Control, 
Procedures, Discipline) and the hierarchy provided in the Provision 
and Use of Work Equipment Regulations (PUWER) 1999, where 
fixed guards shall be provided to prevent exposure to dangerous parts 
of machinery, wherever practicable, and where not so, the provision 
of other guards or protection devices. Information, instruction, train-
ing and supervision are in all cases the lowest level of the hierarchy 
for the control of identified risks.
17 Safety functions designed in accordance with BS EN IEC 61,508 
and BS EN IEC 62,061.
18 For example, INDG199 HSE leaflet on Workplace Transport 
Safety and HSG136 HSE guidance on Workplace Transport Safety, 
both of which are freely available electronically from the HSE web-
site.
13 Edwards vs National Coal Board 1949; ‘Moreover this computa-
tion falls to be made by the owner at a point of time anterior to the 
accident.’
14 R2P2 Reducing Risks Protecting People.
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manufacturer-provided instructions for use in combination 
with suitable and sufficient user risk assessment.
Health and Safety law in the UK is primarily goal-setting 
and requires a regime of self-regulation to ensure compli-
ance with the HASAWA1974, particularly Sections 2 and 3. 
Therefore, the measures, guidance, and techniques outlined 
above are applicable, regardless of whether any specific, 
prescriptive regulation exists. In all cases, applicable good 
practice should be sought, and the duty owner(s) should 
determine appropriate measures to reduce the risk to a 
demonstrably ALARP level using an appropriate hierarchy 
of risk control measures.
For example, in the event that an agribot may be used in 
low-visibility environments, such as mist/fog, or nighttime 
working, the designers would need to consider the measures 
that could be designed into the system to reduce the risk. 
For example, a designer could not demonstrate that risk had 
been reduced ALARP by recommending in the instructions 
for use that the agribot wear hi-visibility clothing, regardless 
of how humanoid in appearance the agribot may be! Firstly, 
this is because Personal Protective Equipment (e.g., hi-vis 
jackets) always forms the lower ranks of any hierarchy of 
risk control measures; correct use of PPE is always subject 
to human error or violation. Secondly, hi-visibility cloth-
ing is used primarily to protect the wearer, whereas in this 
scenario, persons most at risk would likely be those driving 
other vehicles that could potentially impact the agribot. It 
should be clear to a designer that, even in the event of a 
hypothetical stipulation in the instructions for use that the 
agribot should not be used in periods of low visibility or 
nighttime; use in such conditions would certainly consti-
tute reasonably foreseeable misuse. As such, the designer 
has an obligation to ensure that the agribot is provided 
with reasonably practicable measures to increase visibility 
(e.g., lights) and / or other measures to avoid collision (e.g., 
horns / audible warnings). For example, practicable meas-
ures could include (but not limited to): collision detection 
systems based on radar scanning and autonomous avoid-
ance; built-in lighting systems, potentially with safety sys-
tems that prevent operation in low-visibility environments 
when lighting systems are non-functional; hi-visibility paint-
work; reflective strips, reflectors. A combination of these 
elements would likely be necessary to demonstrate that risk 
is reduced ALARP, subject to assessment as described in 
the paragraphs above.
A further example, is the use of agribots on public high-
ways. From the above discussion and example, it should 
be clear that no agribot should be used on public highways 
unless reasonably practicable risk reduction measures are 
implemented. Inherent in the definition of reasonable prac-
ticability is the concept of proportionality; measures taken to 
reduce the risk should be proportional to the risk. Therefore, 
in the event that an agribot is required to autonomously travel 
on or across public roads then collision avoidance safety sys-
tems must be designed-in, similar in extent to those required 
for autonomous road vehicles. However, in the event that an 
agribot can be supervised across a road crossing in manual 
mode or remote mode the exposure to risk is lower, and it is 
reasonable for the designed-in safeguards to be less onerous 
(of course providing that suitable controls are designed-in to 
prevent inadvertent agribot access to public roads).
For the scenario of an agribot crossing a road in a super-
vised/manual/remote mode, the extent to which risk reduc-
tion measures can be designed-in would be firstly dependent 
on the extent to which risk reduction measures are practica-
ble, i.e., technically feasible. For example, crashworthiness/
impact absorption, to prevent damage in passenger carrying 
vehicles, and/or collision avoidance systems that effectively 
distinguish between vehicle hazards, users, members of the 
public, and livestock (which may be crossing simultaneously 
with the agribot). Secondly, the designers would need to be 
assured that they are not introducing additional hazards that 
are potentially higher risk than the hazard they are trying to 
control. For example, designer risk assessment may deter-
mine that any collision detection system should be deac-
tivated, while in manual or remote mode to avoid risks to 
the local user—such as autonomous avoidance resulting in 
the robot reversing into a manual remote controller walking 
closely behind it—or risks increased by non-execution or 
delays to command responses. In this case, the system would 
not be effective for mitigating risk of vehicle impact when 
crossing roads. In such a scenario, complete with supporting 
risk assessment, it may be that the designer is able to rea-
sonably discharge their responsibility for further reduction 
of risk. This is providing that: suitable arrangements are 
provided in design for agribot visibility as discussed above; 
the manual/remote mode is generally and demonstrably safe 
and reliable; a Safe System of Work can be adopted by the 
user that follows the highway code, providing suitable warn-
ing to other road users that a crossing is taking place, and 
controlling/excluding traffic, where necessary.
2.1.3  Accidents and negligence
Legal action in tort for negligence may also be taken against 
manufacturers, agricultural contractors, operators and farm-
ers and their agents for injuries, loss or damages resulting 
from negligence or accidents involving the agribot. How-
ever, unlike strict liability or liability without fault, a claim 
in negligence requires the claimant to prove fault on the part 
of the manufacturer or other person being sued. The follow-
ing must be established; the defendant(s) (such as manu-
facturer/designer, contractor or farm owner) owes a duty of 
care to the claimant, there was a breach of that duty (the 
defendant failed to take care), the claimant was harmed (that 
is personal injury, or damage or loss of property resulted).
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Liability for negligence may fall on any of the parties 
depending on the cause of the accident, and who owes or is 
owed a duty of care in the circumstances of each case. For 
example, the position of the law is that the manufacturers 
owe a duty of care to persons who use their products and 
manufacturers would be deemed to have breached this duty 
where there is a defect in the product. A cause of action (the 
basis for suing the manufacturer) arises where injury or loss 
results from the defect. For liability, it is immaterial that the 
claimants did not purchase the product themselves. There-
fore, suppliers, farmers, contractors and their agents or other 
users who may be injured by any defect in the agribot would 
be entitled to sue the manufacturer for negligence. From 
the perspective of the consumer, an action in negligence 
provides additional protection as product defect may raise a 
prima facie case of negligence.19
Apart from defects, liability for negligence may arise in 
cases of misuse mainly where manufacturers fail to provide 
instructions or where the instructions are inadequate or mis-
understood. Under the EU Machine Directive,20 [transposed 
in the UK as the Supply of Machinery (Safety) Regulations 
2008] the manufacturer or his authorized representative is 
required to provide necessary information such as instruc-
tions before putting machinery on the market and/or put-
ting it into service (art 5 Machine Directive). Regarding the 
general principles for drafting instructions, the Directive 
provides that instructions must be drafted in one or more 
official Community languages (of the EU), and the case of 
machinery intended for use by non-professional operators, 
the wording and layout of the instructions for use must take 
into account the level of general education and acumen that 
can reasonably be expected from such operators (Machinery 
Directive item 1.7 annex 1).
It is, therefore, a question of fact depending on the cir-
cumstances of a case whether warning or instruction is suf-
ficient and whether the manufacturer is liable or not. For 
example, instructions and warnings full of probabilities and 
equations provided to intermediaries (such as agricultural 
contractors) may be sufficient if the contractor is learned in 
and has a good understanding of the agribot. Conversely, 
the same instruction addressed to farmers who (presumably) 
have the less technical knowledge, may need to be more 
basic. Therefore, in a hypothetical scenario where a farmer 
misunderstands the instructions and assumes the agribot is 
safer than it actually is and thereby causes the agribot to 
malfunction and kill a walker, a brochure full of probabili-
ties may be deemed too complicated, and the manufacturer 
may be held liable for accident caused by the farmer’s mis-
use. The key principle is, therefore, that instructions must 
be pitched at the level at which both technical other non-
technical users of the agribot can understand them.
Other provisions of the Machinery Directive particu-
larly relevant to the agribot include the requirement that the 
contents of the instructions must cover both intended use 
of the machinery and any reasonably foreseeable misuse. 
Also, where applicable, the instruction manual must contain 
warnings concerning ways in which the machinery must not 
be used that experience has shown might occur (item 1.7.4 
annex 1 to the Machinery Directive). These provisions sug-
gest the manufacturers would still be deemed to have com-
plied with the law if they fail to give warnings on use and 
misuse which were not known at the time of manufacture or 
design but subsequently becomes known due to self-learn-
ing, the processing artificial intelligence (AI) or repurposing 
of the robot. They also suggest that apart from the manufac-
turer, other users of the agribot could be liable if they ignore 
clear instructions and warnings or continue to use the agribot 
after discovering that it has malfunctioned due to failure to 
follow instructions. However, to benefit from the presump-
tion of conformity with the health and safety requirements 
under the Directive, manufacturers are required to affix CE 
marking on their product and comply with a declaration of 
conformity (arts 5,7).
2.1.4  Accidents caused by agents, employees 
and contractors
Liability for accidents caused by third parties depends on 
whether the person who caused the accident is an agent or an 
independent contractor. Under the law, a principal is vicari-
ously liable for the acts and omissions of his agent when the 
agent is acting within the scope of his authority. The scope 
of an agent’s authority is defined by a contract between the 
agent and the principal. As an example, therefore, liabil-
ity for acts or omissions of the operator of the agribot will 
depend on whether he is an agent of the manufacturer or 
the agricultural contractor or whether he is an independent 
contractor. Similarly, if there is a franchise agreement, the 
franchisor’s liability will depend on whether the franchiSee 
acts in the capacity of an agent. Therefore, while the law 
does not automatically infer an agency relationship from a 
franchise, the agency can be inferred from the contract and 
the circumstances of the case.
As also noted above, liability might depend on whether 
third parties, such as employees, agents or contractors, 
receive adequate instructions on the use of the product. As 
an example, under the Provision and Use of Work Equip-
ment Regulations (PUWER) 1998 (UK), businesses which 
either use or hire out work equipment are required to manage 
the risks from the equipment. Risk management includes 
19 This means fact of defect is sufficient to raise a presumption of 
negligence unless it is disproved.
20 Directive 2006/42/EC came into effect on 29 December 2009 and 
replaced Directive 98/37/EC.
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ensuring that all people who use or manage work equip-
ment receive adequate instructions and appropriate train-
ing. Therefore, apart from the manufacturer, operators of the 
agribot, agricultural contractors and farmers are also legally 
obliged to assume liability for accidents caused by third par-
ties due to misuse.
Furthermore, under the Occupiers Liability Act 1957 and 
1984, an occupier, that is a person in control of land, prem-
ises or buildings can be held liable for injury or harm to 
another person on the land. Such persons can include work-
men, residents, visitors, strangers or even trespassers. One of 
the conditions for the assumption of liability is that the harm 
is caused by a person over whom the occupier has control or 
over which he could exercise some degree of control. It is, 
however, important to note that this liability can be excluded 
by contract.
Finally, damage caused by the escape of things likely to 
cause mischief is borne by the owner of the land provided 
the damage be NIL a reasonably foreseeable consequence 
of the escape (this is the rule in Rylands v Fletcher).21 In 
practice, this might mean a farm owner or farm manager 
could be liable if he (or his agent or anyone under his con-
trol) allows the agribot or things used by the agribot such as 
herbicides to ‘escape’ to adjourning lands or farms and for 
damages resulting from such escape. This position poses a 
little problem when the agribot is operated in manual mode 
as the operator is deemed to be in control. However, when 
operating autonomously, the risk of ‘escape’ may heighten, 
and farmers or other users of the agribot may have to adopt 
additional measures to avoid liability. This may include clos-
ing escape routes and putting warning signs at different ends 
of a road when the agribot is in operation. Although this is 
not a legal requirement, in the UK, farmers routinely close 
local roads to move herds of animals by placing signs and/
or people at both ends before releasing the animals. The 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) has also issued a num-
ber of advice on public access for livestock which would be 
relevant to the operations of the agribot.22 It is, however, 
important to note that the Animals Act 1971(UK) impose 
strict liability on keepers of animals which are of a danger-
ous species.23
The outstanding challenge from the above liability alloca-
tion regimes relates to how to resolve the attribution prob-
lem. For example, despite the clear provisions of the law, 
it might be difficult to ascertain whether damage, injury or 
loss was caused by a defect in the product or misuse such as 
failure to follow instructions. It is conceivable for instance 
that contractors or farmers would tend to attribute loss or 
damage to product defect rather their misuse of the agribot. 
It is also conceivable considering the complex and technical 
nature of the agribot and the fact that law imposes liability 
on the manufacturer for insufficient and unclear instructions, 
that courts might be more inclined to hold manufacturers 
liable in negligence rather than hold users liable for mis-
use. One solution to the possible dilemma is to design the 
robot with detailed data logging system. This would create 
a form of ‘liability by design’ which enables the agribot to 
keep detailed logs of events and incidents including possibly 
replaying an accident to establish if was caused by a sensor 
failure or user command. A data logging system may, there-
fore, assist in identifying where liability falls where there is 
a dispute as to whether accidents are due to manufacturer 
defect or user misuse.
2.2  Administrative actions
2.2.1  Regulation of environmental damage and use 
of chemicals in general
The application of chemicals which may affect the environ-
ment is tightly controlled. This includes the robotic applica-
tion of fertiliser and pesticide chemicals, and their potential 
effects on the human food chain, water supply, neighbour-
ing farms, farm staff, and the more comprehensive public 
environment.
Liability for damage to the environment by activities of 
businesses is regulated by Directive 2004/35/EC of the EU 
Council on Environmental Liability regarding Prevention 
and Remedying of Environmental Damage [transposed in 
the UK as Environmental Damage (Prevention and Reme-
diation) (England) Regulations 2015]. The Directive adopts 
an administrative approach. It does not, therefore, apply to 
cases of personal injury, damage to property or economic 
loss and does not affect any right regarding these types of 
damages (recital 14).
The relevant provisions of the law impose strict liabil-
ity (based on a ‘polluter pays principle’) for pollution of 
the environment caused by certain activities including the 
manufacture, use, storage, processing, filling, release into the 
environment and onsite transport of plant protection prod-
uct. Plant protection products include products for destroy-
ing undesired plants and damage includes damage to water 
and soil. Although liability is strict, a causal link between 
the activity and the damage must be proved, and the law 
allows cost allocation in cases of multiple party causation 
especially concerning the apportionment of liability between 
the producer and the user of a product (art 9). Where envi-
ronmental damage has occurred, the operator is required to 
inform the competent authority and take practical remedial 
21 [1868] UKHL 1.
22 See e.g. HSE, ‘Cattle and Public Access in England and Wales: 
Advice for Farmers, Landowners and Livestock Keepers’ http://www.
hse.gov.uk/pubns /ais17 ew.pdf accessed 03/05/2017.
23 Animals Act 1971, s 1.
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actions to remove or otherwise manage the contaminant (art 
6). The operator bears the costs for the preventive and reme-
dial actions taken under the Directive (art 8).
Effects on water supplies are controlled by Directive 
2000/60/EC (Water Framework); Directive 2008/105/EC; 
and Council Directive 98/83/EC (Drinking Water Directive), 
which set limits on levels of chemicals which may enter pub-
lic water systems. Restrictions on the classification, label-
ling, and packaging of substances and mixtures are defined 
in European Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008.
2.2.2  Use of fertilisers
Apart from general chemical laws, fertilisers are covered by 
addition laws.
The EU Nitrate Directive 91/676/EC aims to protect 
water quality across Europe by preventing nitrates from agri-
cultural sources polluting ground and surface waters and 
by promoting the use of good farming practices. The 2003 
European Fertilisers Directive covers Sale, manufacture and 
labelling of fertilisers. The Directive will apply to the sale of 
fertilisers, which may include the sale of fertilisers included 
as part of a robotic package.
Ammonium nitrate fertiliser may be used as an ingredi-
ent of explosives, so falls under anti-terrorism laws which 
control its storage security. In the UK these include Control 
of Major Accident Hazards Regulations (COMAH); Danger-
ous Substances (Notification and Marking of Sites) Regula-
tions 1990; Ammonium Nitrate Materials (High Nitrogen 
Content) Regulations; and Planning (Hazardous Substances) 
Regulations.
The EU Single Payment Scheme subsidises farms but in 
return imposes environmental protection requirements on 
them which may include limits of fertiliser levels. Further, 
Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (NVZs) are areas designated as 
being at risk from agricultural nitrate pollution (e.g., includ-
ing about 60% of land in England.) There are additional legal 
limits on amounts and times of year for fertilisers which 
can be used in them, imposed by the Nitrates Directive and 
Drinking Water Directive.
2.2.3  Use of herbicides, pesticides and biocides
In addition to general chemical laws, pesticides—and more 
generally, “biocides”—are covered by additional laws. A 
“herbicide” is a chemical which kills one or more plant 
types; a “pesticide” is a chemical which kills “pests” includ-
ing weeds, fungi and insects; a “biocide” is a chemical which 
harms any animals, humans or the environment.
The 2009/128/EC Directive on Sustainable Use of Pesti-
cides [implemented in the UK as “PA Certificates of Compe-
tence” via the transposed Plant Protection Products (Sustain-
able Use) Regulations 2012] aims to protect surface water 
and drinking water from pesticide contamination. Also, 
pesticide use is to be reduced in areas used by the general 
public and in nature conservation areas. It aims to reduce the 
risks and impacts of pesticide use on human health and the 
environment and promote the use of integrated pest man-
agement and alternative approaches, such as non-chemical 
ones. The directive requires operator training for different 
pesticide types and applicator types.24 It also bans aerial 
spraying in all forms, including by autonomous drones and 
manual piloted helicopters. In practice, this aerial ban has 
proved to be problematic for several weed types, including 
needle blight in trees, and bracken in moorland. However, 
the directive also allows member states to grant exemptions, 
on the application, to users for specific nationally approved 
plan types such as these, which are usually administered by 
their environmental agencies (For example, the UK currently 
has around three such approved plans, used under permits 
issued to tens or hundreds of individuals).
The EU Biocides Regulation 528/2012 regulates all sub-
stances harmful to humans, animals and/or the environment, 
i.e., biocides, requiring authorisation for their use. Bulk 
authorisation is provided to users of “on-label” products, 
where the substance manufacturer has handled safety testing 
and defines the appropriate dose size and use-case for appli-
cation, on a product “label”, 25 and the user operates within 
these parameters. When using “on the label”, liability for 
damages caused by the product is transferred from the user 
to the manufacturer. If a user chooses to use the product at a 
different dose or for a different use-case, this is “off-label” 
usage, and the user retains the liability. To comply with the 
Biocides Regulation, the user must thus obtain their off-label 
authorisation, e.g., via an application for a permit from their 
national Environment Agency.
The certification system for human operators appears to 
pose little problem to the robotic application where the agri-
bot is legally considered as a tool of a named human opera-
tor and uses an existing applicator type, such as a knapsack 
or bulk sprayer system. In this case, that human operator 
must hold the required certifications for the herbicide and 
applicator type. Definitions of applicator type may become 
problematic for robots using novel applicators, such as pro-
totype per-plant precision devices. If the robot operates oth-
erwise than as a tool for example under a framework which 
recognises the legal personhood of autonomous robots (See 
Legal Personhood section below), then the definition of cer-
tification again becomes problematic.
25 Usually a long and highly detailed legal document, not a physical 
label on a chemical container.
24 Until 2015, a “grandfathering” scheme allows existing operators to 
practice without certification, this is no longer the case.
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As with operator certification, definitions of on-label 
application use-cases are likely to function for agribots 
spraying using similar technology to a manual knapsack or 
tractor-mounted devices, under legal operation as human 
tools; but the use of novel applicator methods or non-tool 
operation are likely to be problematic or at least require cus-
tom national environment agency licensing.
For manufacturers and sellers of herbicides, additional 
rules are provided in the Machine Directive amendment 
2009/127/EC on Herbicide Application (transposed in the 
UK as EC Fertiliser (England and Wales) Regulations 2006; 
See also the UK Fertilisers Regulations 1990/1991 UK). As 
with fertilisers, these may apply to agribot operators selling 
herbicide as part of a robot product or service package.
2.2.4  Radio communications—scarce spectra
An often-overlooked aspect of agricultural robotics systems 
is the need for long-range communications links from the 
robot in the field to a base station, which in some cases form 
systems as or more complicated than the robots themselves. 
Such communications links, as illustrated in Fig. 4, are 
required if the robot is operating as a tool rather than as a 
legal person—so that the named human operator can moni-
tor its condition sufficiently to intervene in emergencies and 
to take responsibility for its actions. In practice, this will 
often require a video link to monitor the robot’s cameras in 
real time. The video is a bandwidth-hungry medium which 
often requires specialist communications links and equip-
ment. Radio bandwidth is a limited and valuable26 resource 
which must be shared with other local users, so is tightly 
regulated in most countries. Hence the legal need for the 
human operator to take responsibility for the robot’s actions 
must be balanced against the need for legally restricted spec-
trum resources. In the EU, the restriction is performed by 
the Radio Equipment Directive 2014/53/EU, and currently 
in the UK by the Communications Act 2003.
Most current radio communications operate on single, or 
small groups of, identifiable frequencies. Radio communi-
cations have been used from 3 Hz to 300 GHz, with bands 
around higher frequencies carrying more bandwidth than 
those at lower frequencies, but lower frequencies propagat-
ing over long distances more efficiently. Two users transmit-
ting on the same frequency in the same area will interfere 
with each other’s signals. Countries’ laws initially assign the 
rights to transmit on all frequencies to a government body 
called the regulator (In the UK this is Office of Communi-
cations OFCOM; in the USA, the Federal Communications 
Commission, FCC). The regulator is then responsible for 
managing allocations of these frequencies in local areas to 
users.
International standards exist, via the International Tel-
ecommunications Union (ITU), designating certain fre-
quency bands for particular types of use, including for 
national broadcasting, cell phone data, emergency services 
and military communications, and amateur (‘ham’) radio. 
The same standards assign further bands for licensed com-
mercial use, and others for unlicensed public use within the 
defined power and use-type limitations. This allows products 
to operate in the same bands between countries. The regula-
tor typically implements these standards via its licensing to 
users.
Public channels. Domestic ‘WiFi’ (802.11) radio is often 
used for research agricultural robot communications, requir-
ing no special permission from the regulator. In the UK, 
OFCOM allows transmission of data on several frequen-
cies around 2.4 GHz for this purpose but limits transmitter 
power to 100 mW, which typically can stream video up to 
around 100 m ranges. Many domestic (e.g., up to 250 mW) 
and other devices (e.g., many watts) are technically able to 
transmit at higher powers (achieving longer ranges), but this 
would violate the OFCOM regulation.27 Specialist anten-
nas can concentrate the beam transmitted in specified direc-
tions to enable long-range point-to-point communications. 
However, OFCOM power regulations apply to the power 
level receivable at any location rather than to the source 
transmission power. This means that no legal range exten-
sion benefit is obtainable through their use—a 100 mW 
source concentrated along a beam to a destination may have 
the same, illegal, received power as a 1W omni-directional 
source. Across the EU, a public 433 MHz band may also 
be used for low power, short-range communications, suit-
able for sending control commands and occasional sensor 
data, but not live video. Across the world, some bands are 
allocated for public amateur (“ham”) radio, by the regulator 
transferring use to hobbyist organizations, who then allow 
their certified members to use them, under restrictions such 
as preventing purely private use (such as encrypted or closed 
protocol data).
Where public radio channels are insufficient, the regulator 
may lease other dedicated bands in local areas for exclusive 
use by specified users, usually for a significant fee. Wider 
bands cost more but allow higher data rates (In the UK, 
OFCOM’s main schemes are called “technically assigned” 
and “area defined” licences).
26 The high values have been most visibly demonstrated in many 
countries’ recent auctions of spectra to mobile phone companies.
27 From a safety perspective, it should also be noted that 2.4 GHz is 
a microwave frequency, similar to those used in microwave ovens, 
which operate at hundreds of watts for cooking. Multi-watt wifi trans-
mission may be harmful to human tissue as well as illegal.
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2.2.5  Privacy and data protection
Perhaps one of the most significant aspects of the liability 
regime for the agribot is the privacy and data protection 
implications of the information collected during its opera-
tions. Data collection agribots tasks may include monitoring 
of soil and plant conditions, as well as building up maps of 
farms for general navigation. This data can be commercially 
valuable not just to the landowner but to others who might 
have financial interests in the land (such as deciding whether 
to buy it) or in collating data from millions of farms to per-
form the large-scale analysis. Many small farms are owned 
and operated as Sole Traderships rather than as limited 
company structures, linking their data directly to a named 
individual, sole trader and thus making it “personal” data.
According to the European Parliament on Legal Affairs, 
for example, AI and robotics can potentially generate large 
amounts of personal data that can be used as currency to 
purchase services.28 The relevant law is the EU General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2016 which repealed Direc-
tive 96/46/EC (data protection directive). The Regulation 
entered into force on 24 May 2016 and will apply from 25 
May 2018.29 The Regulation applies to the processing of 
“personal data” defined as information relating to an identi-
fied or natural person (data subject). While much of the pro-
visions centre on bridging perceived gaps in the law given 
developments in information technology, provisions relating 
to principles of data processing, privacy by design and auto-
mated decision-making is particularly relevant to agribots.
(a) Principles of data protection
The principles relating to the processing of personal data 
as follows;
1. Lawfulness of processing—The Regulations provide 
that processing of personal data must be Fair, lawful 
and transparent. Consent of the data subject is one of 
the conditions for lawful processing (art 6). Moreover, 
where processing is based on consent, ‘the controller’30 
shall be able to demonstrate that the data subject has 
consented to the processing of his or her personal data 
and the data subject shall have the right to withdraw his 
or her consent at any time (art 7).
It is important to note that although consent is not the only 
mechanism for justifying the processing of personal data, 
it remains a core principle of data processing. Therefore, 
where consent is the basis of processing, it must be clear and 
unambiguous as the consent of the data subject cannot be 
inferred from conduct or inaction. In the case of the agribot, 
there may be instances where it is unclear whether the data 
is personal or who owns the data for consent. For example, 
Company C operates the robot on farmer X’s land and col-
lects detailed soil nutrient information during the run. C then 
operates on neighbouring (and competing) farmer Y’s land 
and makes use of X’s data to optimise the run on Y’s land 
with the result that Y ends up with better-informed run than 
X. Farmer Y might also be interested in buying land from 
farmer X and could obtain private information about its con-
dition and value from the data. The collection is without X’s 
consent. The question may arise whether Company C owes 
any obligation to X concerning the collection and use of the 
detailed soil information. On the one hand, because detailed 
soil information relates to the soil condition and not to the 
individual, it cannot constitute personal data. On the other 
hand, because the collection may invariably involve the col-
lection of geolocation data, (which is deemed personal data), 
Company C may require consent from X. It, therefore, seems 
reasonable to obtain consent to any collection of personal 
data where it would be difficult to isolate personal data from 
the information collected.
2. Purpose limitation—a collection of personal data must 
be for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and 
further processing in a manner that is incompatible with 
those purposes is prohibited.
3. Data minimisation—personal data must be adequate, 
relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to 
the purposes for which they are processed.
4. Accuracy—personal data must be accurate and where 
necessary, kept up to date, and every reasonable step 
must be taken to ensure that personal data that are inac-
curate, having regard to the purposes for which they are 
processed, are erased or rectified without delay.
5. Storage limitation—personal data must be kept in the 
form which permits identification of the data subject for 
no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which 
the personal data are processed. However, data may be 
stored for longer periods if it will be processed solely 
for archiving in the public interest, scientific or historical 
research purposes or statistical purposes.
28 European Parliament, (2014–2019) Committee on Legal Affairs, 
‘Draft Report with Recommendations to the Commission on Civil 
Law Rules on Robotics’ 2015/2103 (INL), p 8 (hereinafter Commit-
tee on Legal Affairs Draft Rules on Robotics).
29 See Regulation EU 2016/679 on the protection of Natural persons 
with regard to the processing of personal data and the free movement 
of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC. The GDPR replaces 
Directive 96/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.
30 The controller is a natural or legal person, public authority, agency 
or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the pur-
poses and means of the processing of personal data. See GDPR art 
4(7).
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6. Integrity and confidentiality—using appropriate techni-
cal or organizational measures, personal data must be 
processed in a manner that ensures appropriate secu-
rity, including unauthorised or unlawful processing and 
against accidental loss, destruction or damage.31
7. Restrictions on transfer—although, transfer of personal 
data outside the EU does not require any specific author-
isation, transfer to third countries or international organ-
izations may take place where the (EU) Commission has 
decided that such third country or organization ensure 
an adequate level of protection for personal data.32
8. Accountability—The controller shall be responsible for 
and be able to demonstrate compliance with the above 
principles.
(b) Privacy by design and restrictions on automated deci-
sion-making
Article 25 of the Regulations mandate the implementa-
tion of privacy by design or privacy by default (PbD). The 
specific provisions of the law are that data controllers shall 
implement appropriate and technical measures for ensur-
ing that by default, only personal data which are necessary 
for each specific purpose of processing are processed. The 
obligation to implement privacy by default applies to the 
amount of data collected, the extent of their processing, the 
period of their storage and their accessibility. In particular, 
the measures shall ensure that by default, personal data is not 
accessible without individual intervention to an indefinite 
number of natural persons (art 23).
The Regulations recommends pseudonymisation as an 
appropriate technical and organizational measure which 
meets the requirements of the regulations and protects the 
rights of data subjects. However, in implementing appropri-
ate technical and organizational measures mandated by the 
law, the controller shall take account of the state of the art, 
the cost of implementation, and the nature, scope, context 
and purpose as well as the risks and likelihood and severity 
posed by personal data processing to the rights of natural 
persons. Under article 22, the data subject has the right not 
to be subject to a decision based solely on automated pro-
cessing, including profiling. The data also subject the right 
to be informed of the existence of automated decision-mak-
ing including profiling and a right to an explanation for the 
logic underlying such decisions as well as the significance 
and consequences of the processing (so-called right to an 
explanation).33
Although the provisions above may pose some difficul-
ties for the development and functioning of agribots, (See 
notes on scope and application of data protection law below) 
they are based on the (arguably correct) presumption that the 
problem with automated decision-making is not so much the 
inability of humans to predict the behaviour of autonomous 
robots. The problem is the need for trust that the decision-
making process is transparent for accountability, reliability 
and trust. As a result, the algorithms that underpin agri-
bot systems need to be as transparent and as interpretable 
as possible, and the agribots must be able to explain their 
behaviour in terms that humans can understand right from 
how they interpreted their output to why they recommend 
a particular output (so-called explanation-based collateral 
systems).34
(c) Data breach reporting and administrative fines and pen-
alties
The Regulation also makes provisions for mandatory data 
breach notification and empowers supervisory authorities 
(national public authorities such as the Information Com-
missioner’s Office in the UK that would monitor and enforce 
the Regulation) to impose administrative fines which could 
be potentially large (a maximum of 20 million Euros or 4% 
of the global annual turnover of the preceding financial year 
whichever is higher) for infringements of certain provisions 
of the law.35 However, while supervisory bodies have the 
power to levy fines and other sanctions, this does not pre-
clude individuals from bringing civil actions. In Vidal-Hall 
v Google Inc.36 for example, the court ruled that misuse of 
personal information is an actionable tort. Agribot operators 
may thus need to invest in specialised secure data storage 
facilities, and consider the use of cryptography to protect 
data stored on and communicated by agribots in the field 
to comply.
2.3  Liability under contract
Liability can arise under a contract between different par-
ties concerning the use and operation of agricultural robots. 
Contractual agreements are particularly important, because 
contracts define the rights, obligations and liabilities of par-
ties and the courts will enforce the terms of a contract vol-
untarily entered into. Therefore, where permitted by law, 
31 See generally GDPR art 5.
32 general principles on transfer are contained in GDPR arts 44–50.
33 See also GDPR art13(f).
34 European Parliament committee on Legal Affairs, ‘Artificial Intel-
ligence: Potential Benefits and ethical Considerations’ p 4 http://
www.europ arl.europ a.eu/RegDa ta/etude s/BRIE/2016/57138 0/IPOL_
BRI%28201 6%29571 380_EN.pdf accessed 13/03/2017.
35 See GDRP arts 33, 51, 58, 83(4) & (5).
36 (2014) EWHC 13 (QB).
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parties may by contract exclude or their limit liabilities. For 
example, parties may by contract agree that it is the duty of 
the agricultural contractor to provide training to the farmer 
on the use of the agribots. They may further agree that such 
training excludes or limit the manufacturer’s liability for 
accidents caused by misuse. The parties may also contract 
to contribute towards damages for loss of reputation which 
is likely to affect the manufacturer’s brand. It is also impor-
tant to note that under rules of privity of contract, only par-
ties to the contract can acquire rights or liabilities under the 
contract. Therefore, in a contract between the farmer and an 
agricultural contractor for the supply of agribots to be used 
for killing weeds, the farmer can only sue the agricultural 
contractor if the agribot was incapable of killing weeds. He 
cannot sue the manufacturer unless the manufacturer is also 
a party to the contract.37
Finally, the scope of remedies under a contract is wide, 
and a party can seek some reliefs for damages caused by a 
breach by the other party or parties. Therefore, an innocent 
party may ask to be discharged from further obligations to 
the party in breach, or claim damages for loss suffered. In 
cases of disputes or claims for breach of contract, courts 
will usually give effect to the terms of the written agreement 
between the parties without extraneous evidence. The con-
tract, therefore, serves as evidence of the intention between 
the parties and must be carefully drafted particularly when 
it involves multiple parties.
2.4  Relevant standards
These are thousands of voluntary technical standards which 
have been established by many organizations for various 
uses, which are beyond the scope of this article. The fol-
lowing is thus only a small sample of relevant standards, as 
examples of a much larger collection:
BS EN 61508 “Functional safety of electrical/electronic/ 
programmable electronic safety-related systems” is a com-
monly used engineering safety standard which defines 
“Safety Integrity Levels” (SIL), and technical safety pro-
cesses such as the use of hazard identification and mitiga-
tion, failsafes, and emergency stop systems.
BS EN 62061—implements principles of BS EN 61508 
(above) and harmonised to parts of the EU Machinery Direc-
tive (ie. a “called up” standard with legal status.)
ISO 10218 “Robots and robotic devices—safety require-
ments for industrial robots.” provides best practices for 
industrial robot safety. ISO 15066 “Robots and robotic 
devices—collaborative robots” provides best practices for 
systems involving robots and humans working together.
ISO 18497 “Safety of autonomous tractors”—is under 
development at the time of writing, and aims to provide best 
practices for the safety of large autonomous tractors.
3  Law and mitigation of damages
A number of the laws examined above appear to be strictly 
worded concerning different forms of liabilities whether 
these arise under contract, tort or statute. However, despite 
the strictness, the law also provides defences and other legal 
means through which a stakeholder in an agribot supply 
chain may avoid liability or mitigate its damages:
(a) Statutory defences statutory defences are defences 
allowed under the law. The relevant defences have been 
discussed under the Product defect above.
(b) Defences to claims for tortious liability although, these 
have also been alluded to earlier, it is useful to briefly 
highlight how the manufacturer could in practice 
defend an action in negligence. As noted above, manu-
facturers may be liable for breaching a duty of care 
owed to users of their products, and the law places the 
burden of proving the negligent act on the injured party 
or the claimant. In effect, the claimant must prove that 
the manufacturer did not take reasonable care to avoid 
the injury or damage occurring. Conversely, it is a 
defence open to the manufacturer that he could not have 
reasonably foreseen the harm to the injured party and 
could, therefore, not have prevented it. This is based 
on the doctrine of the remoteness of damage where 
the manufacturer contends that there is no causal link 
between the manufacturer’s negligence and the injury 
to the claimant. Also, the manufacturer can plead that 
the claimant is contributorily negligent. Contributory 
negligence is a partial defence which enables the neg-
ligent party (e.g., the manufacturer) to claim mitigation 
of damages by proving that the claimant contributed 
to his loss or injury. For example, failure to read the 
instruction manual to take specific recommended steps 
in circumstances where the agribot malfunctions may 
lay a farmer or contractor claimant liable to a claim of 
contributory negligence.
(c) Exclusion clauses where law permits it, parties may by 
contract exclude liability for certain acts or omissions. 
For example, the agribot manufacturer may exclude lia-
bility for illegal use of a robot or use for purposes other 
than that for which robot was manufactured. Liability 
may also be excluded for improper use or interference 
with specifications of agribot software or algorithm 
(See further notes on dual-use items below).
37 Although the contractor can bring an action in tort if this is due to 
a defect in the product but only if he also suffers a damage. See notes 
on product defect above.
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(d) Regulation by design The law now actively promotes 
regulation by design. Under the GDPR, data control-
lers are required to implement appropriate technical 
and organizational measures and procedures in such a 
way that data processing will meet the requirements of 
the law. It is significant that the law allows data control-
ler to take account of state of the art in technological 
development and the cost of implementation in con-
forming to the requirement (See notes above).
(e) Insurance There is no specific insurance framework 
for robotics. However, insurance can be mandated by 
law or by contract between the parties. Also, specialist 
insurance may be required, and in this regard, it has 
been proposed that insurance develop new products 
and law mandate compulsory insurance scheme sup-
plemented by a fund (See further notes below).
(f) Judicial approaches The Legal regime for compensa-
tion and Judicial approaches to the award of damages 
could also have a mitigating effect on liability. Courts 
are careful not to expand the scope of existing liability 
regime. For example, the provisions of the Compensa-
tion Act and the approach by the courts suggests that 
courts may be circumspect in allowing claims for dam-
ages caused by the agribots considering its essential 
economic function of killing weeds and making more 
land available for farming. For example, under the 
Compensation Act 2006 (UK), courts are required to 
take into account the fact that allowing specific claims 
may have adverse consequences for innovation and 
investment in desirable activities.38 In other words, the 
law considers that if it is too easy to make successful 
claims concerning specific activities, the courts may be 
overwhelmed with cases for compensation. This risk 
often referred to as ‘opening the floodgates (of litiga-
tion)’ would inhibit investment in activities which are 
useful for the society or which are of economic, social 
or technological significance.
4  Grey areas relating to current legal 
concepts
The grey areas refer to aspects of liability in agricultural 
robotics where the law is unclear or uncertain. The most 
relevant issues considered here include the legal effect of the 
autonomy of agribot on the liability of the parties and liabil-
ity for dual-use of the agribot as well as the likely effects of 
the EU data protection law. This section highlights the main 
arguments in this area and where relevant, the proposed 
solutions to the challenges.
4.1  The ethics of robot autonomy
Under EU law, (non-autonomous) robots can be classified as 
products and humans are ultimately responsible for defects, 
errors, or misuse of the robot (See notes on liability for prod-
uct defect above). For autonomous robots, the applicable 
laws and principles are not so clear. Directive 85/374/EEC 
has no direct applicability to liability for damages caused by 
autonomous robots, and there is currently no definition of 
autonomous robots under EU laws.
Nevertheless, one proposal defines robot autonomy as the 
ability of the robot to take decisions and implement them 
in the outside world independently of external control or 
influence.39 The key features of robot autonomy include the 
development of autonomous and cognitive features such as 
the ability to learn from experience and take independent 
decisions, increasing capacity for adaptability and the exhi-
bition of emergent behaviours. In effect, if an autonomous 
robot encounters difficulties that its design did not anticipate, 
its actions will not always be a result of programming as its 
learning abilities can cause the robot to develop sophisti-
cated interaction with the environment which leads to unpre-
dictability in its behaviour.40
Presumably, therefore, the more autonomous robots 
are, the less likely they will be considered as mere tools 
in the hands of other actors such as manufacturer, owner 
and users.41 However, it is not always clear whether and the 
extent to which robots should be autonomous. As examples, 
the UK House Committee on Robotics and Artificial Intel-
ligence made the point that it is important that AI technology 
is operating as intended and that unwanted, or unpredictable, 
behaviours are not produced, either by accident or mali-
ciously’.42 Also, in a report by the EU, it was suggested that 
it is inconceivable that once another actor no longer controls 
a robot, it becomes the actor itself. The report argues further 
that a robot being a mere machine and a carcass devoid of 
consciousness, feelings and thoughts or its own will can-
not become an autonomous legal actor.43 This observation 
arguably undermines the very notion of robot autonomy. For 
example, since autonomy is taken to involve self-learning 
and the processing of artificial intelligence, then a design 
38 See Compensation Act 2006s 1(b).
39 Committee on Legal Affairs, ‘Draft Rules on Robotics’, Recital R.
40 Committee on Legal Affairs Draft Rules on Robotics, Recital Z.
41 Committee on Legal Affairs Draft Rules on Robotics, Recitals Q, 
R, S.
42 See House of Commons, Science and Technology Committee, 
‘Robotics and Artificial Intelligence’ (12 October 2016) p 16.
43 European Parliament, European Civil Law Rules in Robotics 
(Study for the JURI Committee) 2016 p 13 (hereinafter EU Parlia-
ment, Civil Law Rules in Robotics).
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that limits that autonomy also limits the use of the robot and 
could potentially stifle further innovation in robotics.
As noted in another report by the EU, however, it is 
expected that ultimately AI could surpass human intellectual 
capacity in a manner which, if not prepared for, could pose a 
challenge to humanity’s capacity to control its creation …’44 
This position suggests that robot autonomy is a given and 
technical (but legitimate) questions can be raised concerning 
the legal consequences of such autonomy particularly the 
legal responsibility arising from a robot’s harmful action. In 
a hypothetical scenario involving the agribot, the following 
could occur; the obstacle avoidance on the agribot works 
but the robot ‘decides’ it could overcome an obstacle. An 
accident occurs, and a walker is injured. All parties deny 
liability. The manufacturer argues that the accident occurred 
independently as the robot was acting autonomously, the 
insurers refuse to indemnify the manufacturer based on the 
argument that the operation which caused the accident is 
not a ‘defect’, the injured party claims that the accident is 
caused by manufacturer defect regardless of robot autonomy. 
The question this raises is, therefore, is whether and how a 
machine can be held liable for its actions or omissions.45
Although it is not yet clear what values machines should 
use, and how to embed these values in them, it has been 
suggested that they should function according to values that 
are aligned with those of humans and consider following, 
as much as possible, ethical theories defined for humans.46 
Therefore, guiding legal and ethical frameworks for the 
design, production and use of robots and AI must be based 
on values such autonomy, individual responsibility, informed 
consent, and privacy and social responsibility.47 The propos-
als examined below are relevant in this respect.
4.1.1  Proportional liability
To promote certainty, responsibility and accountability, it 
has been suggested that a set of rules be developed which 
reflects the proportionality of liability depending on the 
instructions given to the robot and its capacity for self-
learning as well as its level of autonomy.48 Assuming that 
damage, injury or loss could be established, the following 
rules of liability apply;
(a) Manufacturers and producers should be strictly liable 
for damage that can be traced back to the robot’s design 
such as an error in the algorithm causing injurious 
behaviour.49 (See notes above on how technical designs 
can aid the law in this area mainly because of attribu-
tion problems)
(b) For robots sold with open source software, liability 
should in principle be on the person who programmed 
the application which led to the robot causing damage. 
This is increasingly being incorporated into contracts.
(c) When damage is caused when the robot is still learn-
ing, its user or owner should be held liable. However, 
liability should be further governed by whether the user 
is a professional user and whether or not they are the 
victim. If the damage is caused to a victim who is also 
a professional, this would be considered as an accident 
at work covered by existing laws governing such acci-
dents. If the damage is linked to robot instruction given 
by a professional user which causes damage to a third 
party, then the situation calls for the development and 
application of new rules
(d) In cases where the robot is hired out, the hirer should 
remain liable. The rationale is that it is difficult, given 
that each hirer may teach the robot different things, to 
determine which hirer is responsible for the acts of the 
robot.
  For agribots, manufacturers and agricultural contrac-
tors are likely to fall into this category and would thus 
be deemed to be liable in cases where the agribot is 
hired out.
(e) Finally, future legislative instruments should provide 
for the application of strict liability for damage caused 
by smart robots. In effect, only proof of a causal link 
between the harmful behaviour of the robot and the 
damage suffered by the injured party is required. There 
should also be no restrictions on the type and extent of 
damages which may be recovered, and there should be 
no limit on the forms of compensation which may be 
offered to the aggrieved party on the sole ground that 
damage was caused by a non-human agent.50
4.1.2  Legal personhood
It is possible in theory to confer legal personality on robots. 
This allows the autonomous robot to have the status of an 
‘electronic person’ for liability and rights.51 “Legal per-
sonhood” is a purely legal concept and is unrelated to the 
concept of “personhood” in Philosophy, which has been 
44 Committee on Legal Affairs Draft Rules on Robotics, Recital I.
45 Committee on Legal Affairs Draft Rules on Robotics, Recitals S.
46 Francesca Rossi, ‘Artificial Intelligence: Potential Benefits and 
Ethical Considerations’ (European Parliament Legal Affairs Commit-
tee Briefing) 2016 p 4.
47 Committee on Legal Affairs, ‘Draft Rules on Robotics’, 2016 p 7.
48 EU Parliament, ‘Civil Law Rules in Robotics’, 17.
49 EU Parliament, ‘Civil Law Rules in Robotics’ p 17.
50 See generally Committee on Legal Affairs Draft Rules on Robot-
ics, p 13.
51 This is similar to the concept of corporate legal personality which 
allows confers legal entities on companies and corporations, thus sep-
arating the corporation or company from its promoters, managers and 
directors.
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defined by various authors via difficult philosophical prop-
erties such as “free will” and “consciousness”. Legal person-
hood in robotics would be intended purely as a mechanism 
to assign legal liability, in the same way that corporations 
are sometimes considered to be legal persons. In particu-
lar, like corporate personhood, it provides a mechanism to 
replace liability assigned to individual human operators 
with liability assigned to some group of humans such as the 
robot design team. This is important and useful, for exam-
ple, if individual human operators do not wish to take on 
potential personal liability for deaths caused by the robots, 
which could result in prison and other sentences on them as 
individuals. Spreading the liability across the design team 
via legal personhood would avoid this situation whilst still 
ensuring that the responsibility still exists in a suitable form.
However, objections to robotic legal personhood have 
been raised to this proposal on ethical and conceptual coher-
ence grounds. It w argued for instance that legal personhood 
status for the robot would unavoidably trigger unwanted 
and nonsensical legal consequences including the need to 
determine what robots’ rights would be and how to respect 
those rights. In theory, a robot legal person (or more likely, 
a belligerent human claiming to act on its behalf, for exam-
ple to sabotage a robotics company’s product or service, as 
human campaign groups currently do against animal test-
ing companies by acting on behalf of the animals) might 
then be entitled to demand rights for the robot which were 
originally intended only for humans legal persons, such as 
employment leave, minimum wage, and refusal to work in 
dangerous environments.
Although conferring rights on robots could be potentially 
nonsensical, the problem only arises if the arguments are 
considered from a purely economic perspective. From a 
legal perspective, an artificial legal entity does not have to 
be conferred with the same rights as humans. In fact, taking 
the example of corporations, the law may not confer any 
direct rights or duties on the entity but rather on its direct-
ing minds or promoters. Therefore, for robots, electronic 
personhood would create the advantage of legal conveni-
ence such as making the robot a distinct legal entity which 
can sue and be sued. It would also vest the robot with the 
genuinely useful capability to apply for and obtain work or 
operating licence (e.g., an agribot (or rather its designers 
on its behalf) can apply for certification to use pesticides, 
removing the need for operators to hold the certificate, and 
transferring the liability onto the engineering design team). 
Electronic personhood can also help the robot (or rather, the 
human design team which it represents) fulfil obligations to 
self-insure and like corporations, pay compensation to those 
injured by its acts or omissions, again reducing the risk to 
individual operators.
It is important to note that the robot will have to be reg-
istered in the same way as corporations and may have to be 
vested or equipped with assets to enable it to carry out its 
duties and obligations. The promoters of the robot will make 
the choices about which party(ies) will fund the assets. More 
importantly, however, despite the electronic personhood, the 
court would be able to lift the veil of incorporation in appro-
priate cases to render the promoters liable for crimes and 
civil wrongs committed by the robot.
4.1.3  Registration and insurance
This is a recommendation for a system of registration for 
advanced robots based on a criterion established for the clas-
sification of robots.52 A Union-wide Agency would manage 
the registration which would serve the purpose of trace-
ability for robotics and artificial intelligence.53 Similarly, 
the proposal for insurance advocates the establishment of 
an insurance scheme which obliges the producer to take 
out insurance for the autonomous robot it produces. It is 
proposed that a fund supplements the obligatory insurance 
scheme to ensure that damages can be compensated for in 
cases where no insurance cover exists.54
4.2  Dual‑use products
EU law regulates Dual-use products.55 The Regulation sets 
up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, 
brokering and transit of dual-use items and aims to control 
trade in dual-use items to counter the proliferation of weap-
ons of mass destruction and other items of potential mili-
tary use.56 Therefore, the Regulation requires that Dual-use 
items (including software and technology) should be subject 
to effective control when they are exported from the Euro-
pean Community.57 Dual-use items are defined as ‘…items, 
including software and technology, which can be used for 
both civil and military purposes, and shall include all goods 
which can be used for both non-explosive uses and assist 
in any way in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices’. 58 Annexe 1 to the Regulation 
contains a list of dual-use items including nuclear materi-
als (e.g., uranium), telecommunications and information 
52 Committee on Legal Affairs Draft Rules on Robotics, p 13.
53 Committee on Legal Affairs Draft Rules on Robotics p 13.
54 Committee on Legal Affairs Draft Rules on Robotics p 13.
55 See COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 
setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, trans-
fer, brokering and transit of dual-use items (hereinafter Regulation 
428/2009).
56 See EU Parliament, ‘Implementation Appraisal Control of Trade 
in Dual Use Items’ (…Committee briefing 2016).
57 Regulation 428/2009, Recitals 2, 3.
58 Regulation 428/2009, art 2.
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security, sensors and lasers, various software, machine tools, 
chemical manufacturing equipment.
The law requires dual-use items to be registered and sub-
ject to authorisation and export control including a detailed 
register of exports (art 20) and a review and update as well 
as impact assessment of dual-use items.
It is notable that the law can be extended to products 
with potential dual-use that are not listed in Annex 1 to the 
Regulations (art 4, 15). In fact, in its draft rules on robot-
ics, the EU legal committee recommends that the provisions 
on dual-use regulations should apply to robots.59 Perhaps, 
because the Regulation intends to ensure that dual-use items 
do not get into the hands of malicious actors, it only imposes 
liability on manufacturers for non-compliance with relevant 
provisions. However, new issues on liability can arise in the 
use and operation of the agribot. To illustrate, as agricultural 
robots are designed to operate in harsh outdoor conditions, 
they may bear functional similarities to, and be repurposable 
as, military systems such as explosive ordnance disposal 
(EOD), reconnaissance, and weaponised platforms. It is, 
therefore, conceivable that in the wrong hands they could be 
used to commit crimes including acts of terrorism, such as 
delivering lethal substances or weapons into crowded areas.
It is clear on the one hand that the malicious actor or 
any other person(s) that repurposed the agribot to carry 
out the criminal or terrorist acts would be deemed to have 
committed a crime for which he would be liable to punish-
ment upon conviction. Also, he could be liable for dam-
ages to the parties thereby injured in a civil action. On the 
other hand, it is not clear whether the manufacturer bears 
(or should bear) any liability. As already noted above, the 
EU Directive on Product Defect applies only to defective 
products; that is, products not providing the safety to which 
a consumer is entitled. It is also notable that one of the 
factors to be taken into account - in determining whether a 
product is defective or not- include whether the product is 
being put to reasonable use.60 However, while unreason-
able use can give rise to mitigation of damages, it does not 
entirely absolve the manufacturer of liability, and the prob-
lem can become particularly complex if such re-purposing 
is foreseeable or can be anticipated by the manufacturer. 
Under the EU Machinery Directive, for instance, the con-
tents of the instructions must cover not only the intended 
use of the machinery but also take into account any reason-
ably foreseeable misuse.61
The question, therefore, is what uses should be deemed 
reasonably foreseeable? For example, is it reasonably 
foreseeable that an agribot can be used for criminal or ter-
rorist purposes? If the answer is yes, then how is the posi-
tion different from using a kitchen knife to commit mur-
der. The knife is sold as a kitchen utensil, not as a weapon, 
so although the manufacturer can reasonably foreSee that 
the knife could be used for heinous crimes, he is not held 
responsible for the murderer’s action. Arguably, the argu-
ment would be different if the robot was developed purely 
for the purpose of committing crimes—such as a modi-
fied agricultural robot with a new implement attachment 
designed specifically for breaking and entering domestic 
windows and with no other clear function—then respon-
sibility can lay with the manufacturer if the robot is 
repurposed for further criminal or unlawful purpose. As 
described in the discussion of health and safety law in 
Sect. 2, the resolution of this discussion is largely depend-
ent on whether firstly, practicable risk reduction measures 
(i.e., what can be done about the reasonably foreseeable 
hazards) are readily identifiable, and secondly, whether 
implementation of those measures is reasonable. In the 
case of the knife, a well-established implement for which 
many examples of good practice design are available, it is 
unlikely that further risk reduction measures are practica-
ble (i.e., technically feasible) that have not already been 
tried and their relative virtue exhaustively evidenced. In the 
case of the agricultural robot, the industry is still subject 
to errors in internal communication, for example, due to 
intellectual property protection, lack of established industry 
groups and forums, and general lack of publicly available 
evidence of safety improvements; therefore, the identifica-
tion of practical risk reduction measures and the reduction 
in risk associated with reasonably foreseeable hazards may 
not be straightforward for designers.
Furthermore, in what ways should the instructions take 
into account reasonably foreseeable misuse? For example, 
the fact that instructions expressly prohibit certain re-pro-
gramming or re-purposing would hardly deter a malicious 
actor bent on misusing the agribot. These issues would need 
to be addressed when developing rules applicable to robotics 
particularly small robots like the agribot.
4.3  Scope and application of data protection law
It was noted earlier that the new EU Regulations on data 
protection make significant provisions that would impact on 
developments in robotics and AI. While Much of the provi-
sions address gaps in the law, they also raise difficult ques-
tions on the scope of the law and its impact and applicabil-
ity to robotics. As examples, article 25 now makes PbD a 
legal standard, and arguably enhances the protection of indi-
vidual privacy. However, given the rapidly evolving tech-
nology environment, and the fact that vulnerabilities and 
susceptibilities (to privacy infractions) may only become 
59 Committee on Legal Affairs ‘Draft Rules on Robotics’ item 34 p 
12.
60 See notes on product defects above.
61 See Directive 2006/42/EC, item 1 of Annex 1.
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known subsequent to use or operation of products, as well 
as the expansive and ambulatory nature of the concept of 
privacy,62 the question must be asked whether it is possible 
(even using state of the art) to identify and assess all privacy 
implications and dimensions of particular technologies?
Furthermore, under article 22 relating to algorithms that 
make decisions based on user-level predictors which sig-
nificantly affect users, the law effectively creates a ‘right 
to explanation’. This entitles users to ask for an explana-
tion of an algorithmic decision that was made about them 
(See previous notes above). Although decisions based on 
algorithms raise difficult ethical and privacy questions, the 
provision also poses significant challenges for the AI and 
machine learning community. As examples, it is a common 
misconception that complex algorithms always do what 
their designers choose to have them do when in fact, it is 
difficult to understand, predict, and explain the behaviour 
of advanced AI systems because of the complexity of the 
systems and the large volume of data they use.63 Also, from 
a technical perspective, a requirement that algorithms offer 
explanations for their underlying decisions could potentially 
prohibit the algorithms currently in use. This means to com-
ply with the law, a complete overhaul of standard and widely 
used algorithmic techniques may be required.64
Finally, while the GDPR applies directly to all EU mem-
ber states, it is unclear, given the uncertain political terrain 
precipitated by Brexit, how and the extent to which the law 
would apply to the UK. For example, even if the UK adopts 
the GDPR, (which will take effect before the UK exits the 
EU), will the UK be bound to continue to implement the 
GDPR and its subsequent amendments? What would be the 
effect of the opinions, studies etc. conducted by the EU on 
the formulation of policies on robotics, machine learning, AI 
and cognitive computing in the future? More importantly, 
since the GDPR now establishes both a European Data Pro-
tection Board (EDPB) and national supervisory authorities, 
what are the effects of the multiple (or at least dual) admin-
istrative and compliance regimes that the Brexit could poten-
tially create for the AI and robotics community in the EU?
5  Conclusion
The liability regime which applies to the use and opera-
tion of the agribot appears to be complicated. However, an 
essential aspect of this regime is that parties have different 
rights and obligations under different laws which make it 
possible to distribute liabilities. The law also allows defences 
which are particularly specific and relevant for promoting 
developments in technology. More crucially, where permit-
ted by law, parties may re-allocate liabilities and claim con-
tributions for damages arising from accidents involving the 
agribot.
The outstanding issue requiring consideration is how 
autonomy should be defined in the context of the operation 
of the agribot. Unless law, policy or (for present purposes) 
contracts define the scope of the autonomy of the robot, 
the liability regime may be challenged by technical legal 
arguments.
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